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Abstract 
Governments around the world, but especially in Europe, have increasingly used private sector 
involvement in developing, financing and providing public health infrastructure and service 
delivery through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Although PPPs have attracted practitioner 
and academic interest over the last two decades, there has been no attempt to integrate the 
general management and health management literatures to provide a holistic view of PPPs in 
healthcare delivery. This study analyzes over 1,400 publications from a wide range of 
disciplines over a 20-year time period. We find that despite the scale and significance of the 
phenomenon, there is relatively limited conceptualization and in-depth empirical investigation. 
Based on bibliographic and content analyses, we synthesize formerly dispersed research 
perspectives into a comprehensive multi-dimensional framework of public-private partnerships. 
In so doing, we provide new directions for further research and practice.  
 
Keywords: Public-private partnership, public and private actors, health management, 
management practice, systematic literature review, content analysis, bibliographic analysis  
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Introduction 
European countries and indeed governments around the world have increasingly turned to 
private sector involvement in the development, financing and provision of public infrastructure 
and services (Maynard, 1986; Zheng et al., 2008; Mahoney et al., 2009; Anderson, 2012; 
Saussier, 2013). Their advocates argue that by promoting increased diversity of provision and 
contestability, such ‘partnerships’ secure better quality infrastructure and services at ‘optimal’ 
cost and risk allocation (Kwak et al., 2009). Although conceptually a public-private partnership 
(PPP) can be defined relatively simply, as “a long-term contract between a private party and a 
government agency, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears 
significant risk and management responsibility” (World Bank Institute, 2012:11), there is 
variation in practice based on the separation of ownership and risk-bearing between the public 
and private sector actors. This study focuses on PPPs defined as business models for linked 
infrastructure and services, excluding, for instance, PPPs for drug research where private sector 
contributions are of a more charitable nature. 
Please insert ‘Figure 1’ about here 
 
Over the past decade, the use of PPPs has grown almost five-fold (PWC, 2010), with nearly 
US$ 4 billion of health PPP contracts were signed worldwide in 2010 alone (Carty, 2012). It is 
intriguing to note therefore that despite their global prevalence, empirical evidence of benefits 
is mixed. Nonetheless, PPPs continue to be deployed for a range of public sector infrastructure 
and service delivery. In the UK, there are more than 600 PPPs in the form of Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) arrangements worth over US $100 billion for hospitals, schools, prisons, 
bridges, roads and military equipment (HM Treasury, 2013). More specifically there has been a 
sharp rise – again predominantly within Europe/UK - in PPPs to deliver healthcare 
infrastructure including buildings, large technology systems, clinical services, and associated 
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non-clinical maintenance and facility management services (Barlow et al., 2013; Roehrich et 
al., 2013). The increasing popularity of PPPs can also be observed in many other developed, 
developing and emerging economies (e.g. English, 2005; Guasch et al., 2008; Yang et al., 
2013).  
Although the PPP phenomenon has attracted a wide range of practitioner and academic 
comment, there is limited systematic review of evidence and the literature remains largely 
fragmented (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012). In this article, we engage in a comprehensive review 
of the PPP literature and published empirical evidence to ask the following questions: (i) What 
is the current state of public-private partnership research? and (ii) What are the emerging 
themes of interest for health research? This study offers a timely analysis of health PPP 
arrangements, constituting a large proportion of PPPs around the world, rather than a broad 
overview of PPPs (e.g. Kwak et al., 2009). We address these questions and current limitations 
in the literature by developing a framework for research on public-private partnerships based 
on comprehensive bibliographic and content analyses of over 1,400 PPP papers published over 
the last two decades. Following the suggestions by Ferlie et al. (2012), and in contrast with 
narrow classification approaches such as Pantouvakis and Vandoros’ (2006) review of PPP in 
construction, we include the wider management literature alongside specific PPPs in the 
healthcare context, thus accessing a broader range of ideas and theoretical traditions.   
The paper is structured as follows: After outlining the systematic review method, we 
analyze the PPP literature for specific patterns and trends. We then offer a synthesis of PPP 
research, distinguishing between specific themes connected to the policy and practice of PPPs 
and their outcomes. The paper concludes by proposing a multi-dimensional framework and 
drawing out implications for both theory and practice. 
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Methods  
The systematic review adopts an iterative review procedure and search strategy – Figure 2 - 
aimed at mitigating bias and deploying a comprehensive search and analysis framework, 
incorporating cross-referencing between researchers, extensive database searches, and applying 
agreed exclusion criteria (Tranfield et al., 2003; Deneckere et al., 2012). Commencing with an 
initial scoping study, seminal PPP papers were content analyzed using the software package 
NVivo. This initial analysis established a focus for the subsequent analysis stages by, for 
instance, specifying the search period and search terms. In addition, eight subject experts were 
interviewed to further improve the search strategy and search terms. This led us, for instance, to 
explicitly consider both macro policy dimensions and more operational processes such as 
negotiation, governance and stakeholder management.  
The analysis was conducted in two parts. In part I, the Web of Knowledge database was 
searched for PPP-related publications between 1990 and 2011. In part II, we focused on PPP 
research papers published in diverse journals such as, but not limited to, accounting and 
finance, strategic management, operations management, economics and healthcare. Based on 
published reviews and journal ranking lists from the UK Association of Business Schools 
(ABS) and Web of Science rankings, we selected peer-reviewed journals, because they exhibit 
high disciplinary standing and can be considered validated knowledge (Podsakoff et al., 2005). 
This ensured that the publications included had been subject to assurance systems for academic 
quality and rigor (Lockett et al., 2006). Our systematic review process is outlined in Figure 2. 
Please insert ‘Figure 2’ about here 
 
 Subsequently, specific search terms were the subject of an extensive consultation phase 
including all authors and a research assistant. The terms included PFI, Private Finance 
Initiative, PPP, Public Private Partnership, Private Finance Project, public or private 
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infrastructure projects, private sector contracting, risk transfer, value for money, VfM, PFP, 
DBFO, BOOT, public infrastructure project*, and inter organization* public private 
relationship*, public non-profit, public enterprise*, public alliance*, and non-profit 
partnership*. ISI Web of Knowledge is widely considered to be the comprehensive database for 
scholarly work. The period 1990-2011 was selected because relatively few PPP papers were 
published before 1990 and this period provides sufficient span to enable a comprehensive and 
meaningful analysis. After reading the abstracts, we excluded editorials, transcribed speeches, 
book reviews and books for our subsequent analyses. All remaining papers were then read and 
evaluated for inclusion by categorizing them against an agreed set of criteria, ensuring that the 
papers were: (i) focused on public-private relationships; (ii) scholarly publications; and (iii) of 
conceptual, quantitative or qualitative empirical nature.  
 Data analysis was supported by NVivo to help summarize, compare and contrast 
emergent themes. For example, key themes such as risk management, stakeholder alignment 
and accounting treatment emerged from in-depth analysis and facilitated the data synthesis 
steps leading to a multi-dimensional framework. The data synthesis and analysis, a key value-
added element of a comprehensive review (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010), consisted of two parts. 
First, basic patterns of PPP publications were examined; and second, themes – policy drivers, 
strategic processes, operational processes and PPP outcomes – across macro and micro levels 
of analysis were identified. 
 
Analysis I: Patterns of Publication 
Mirroring the upsurge in PPPs over the last two decades, figure 3 illustrates the increase in 
publications, including a number of special issues, in a wide range of journals. Although PPP 
has been subject to scrutiny by researchers from various different disciplines, accountancy, 
finance and public management perspectives predominate. That these areas are particularly 
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interested in PPP research is not surprising – after all, notions of financial value and risk 
transfer lie at the conceptual heart of PPP, and public sector specialists should question policies 
that influence the boundary of the State (Engel et al., 2013). However, given that the 
phenomenon invokes overlapping issues with various social, political and economic 
implications, a greater diversity in the conceptual ecology might have been expected. For 
instance, neither the organizational studies or strategic management fields nor their functional 
management sub-fields, such as procurement and supply management, human resources, and 
information systems management, have shown sustained interest. Equally, given that PPPs are 
intended to influence boundaries, for instance, between state and market, principle and agent, 
products and services, very little research (with some notable exceptions, e.g. Klijn & Teisman, 
2003) has adopted a network perspective.  
Articles also cover a number of different sectors with healthcare, transport, housing and 
education being most prevalent. While PPP publications in the 1990s focused mainly on the 
healthcare and transport sectors, there was a trend towards other sectors such as urban 
redevelopment, prisons, and education from the early 2000s (e.g. Cabral et al., 2010). There 
were few cross-industry studies that capture the variants in PPP arrangements including 
different sectors, project sizes and ownership structures. Perhaps inevitably this diversity has 
meant that the specific definition and type of PPP project is often variable and sometimes 
unclear (see Table 1). 
Please insert ‘Table 1’ and ‘Figure 3’ about here 
 
To date the predominant countries for PPP research have been the USA and UK (63% of the 
total PPP-related publication) but, just as PPPs are gaining prominence elsewhere, there is now 
a growing body of work focusing on both developed economies (Germany, Netherlands and 
Ireland, Australia) and, increasingly, developing countries such as India and Lebanon (Figure 
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4). Although relatively limited, there is a promising body of international comparative work 
such as Boxmeer and Beckhoven’s (2005) comparative study of Dutch and Spanish urban 
regeneration PPPs.  
Please insert ‘Figure 4’ about here 
 
Problematically, there is no consistency or cumulative development with regard to, for 
instance, methodology, units of analysis, key findings and sample. Indeed, a relatively high 
number of papers do not mention or clarify their research methodology. The case study 
approach tends to be the primary data collection method at the project and inter-organizational 
level of analysis, with more limited use of a survey methodology. Surprisingly, despite the 
long-term nature of most PPPs, there is only limited evidence of publications adopting a 
longitudinal or process perspective (e.g. Roehrich & Caldwell, 2012). Prior publications 
address ‘whole life-cycle’ issues in PPPs by primarily relating to important themes such as 
costing analysis. However, other important whole life-cycle management issues such as staff 
turnover and relationship management remain neglected and therefore constitute fruitful further 
research avenues. Table 2, for example, summarizes an illustrative selection of PPP articles 
highlighting how different authors have studied PPPs at different levels of analysis, adopting 
different theoretical lenses and emphasizing various key dimensions. Large-scale quantitative 
and longitudinal studies were, until recently, rare and much of the evidence relies on case 
studies. 
Please insert ‘Table 2’ about here 
 
Analysis II: Emerging PPP Research Themes  
In order to clarify the state of the art of PPP knowledge and pave the way for future research, 
this section provides a summary and critical reflection on the key themes - PPP outcomes, the 
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policy of PPPs, the practice of PPPs - identified by the review. We acknowledge that there will 
be thematic overlaps between the subsections, but it is the unit/level of analysis that acts as a 
key distinguishing factor. More specifically, while the Policy theme focuses on the macro, the 
Practice theme focuses on the meso and micro levels of analysis. 
PPP Outcomes 
The theme ‘PPP outcomes’ focuses on the benefits and disadvantages of deploying PPP 
arrangements. Extant literature offers an incoherent picture of PPP outcomes with regards to its 
benefits and disadvantages. Potential benefits are said to include the freedom to allow public 
sector to concentrate on, for example, clinical services, rather than managing infrastructure, and 
increased efficiency in project delivery realized by the private sector (Barlow et al., 2013). 
However, there is a significant number of studies raising concerns over PPP performance: it 
may stifle improvements because of limited contractor capacity compared to project size, that 
transaction costs are too high throughout the project life-cycle, there is limited integration 
between clinical service models and infrastructure design and delivery, and limited innovation 
in new-build healthcare PPPs (Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2009).  
Studies conclude that hospital build quality is not unambiguously better for PFIs, and 
facilities management services provide actually lower value for money (VfM) when compared 
to non-PFI hospitals (Liebe & Pollock, 2009; Pollock et al. (2011). There is also a critique that 
notions such as VfM and risk transfer are regularly conflated; leading to spurious conclusions 
regarding benefits and costs. English (2005), for example, used the failure of the Latrobe 
Regional Hospital in Australia as a reminder of both the importance and the difficulty of VfM 
estimates. In the UK, PFI arrangements have been criticized on all these points and ample 
concern has been expressed about the cost of the debt and risk incurred compared to 
government borrowing (Liebe & Pollock, 2009).  
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The Policy of PPP 
Subthemes in this section are mainly concerned with macro-level reflections on finance issues 
such as accounting treatment, risk allocation, etc. and policy concerns such as the general 
appropriateness and fit of PPPs for delivering public sector infrastructure and services. 
The often-stated policy aim of PPPs, part of the New Public Management logic, is to achieve 
higher efficiency by bundling investments, infrastructure and service delivery (Boyne, 2002; 
Engel et al., 2013) in order to draw on expertise and sometimes financial resources, as 
illustrated by UK PFIs, from the private sector (Hood, 1995). Additionally, it is suggested that 
working with private sector companies may allow public sector organizations to access 
idiosyncratic resources and capabilities that may bring about more innovative responses and, 
for instance, improved health services quality (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012). This is in stark 
contrast to a purely contracting out approach where the public sector “hands over” public sector 
infrastructure and service provision to the private provider with limited control or involvement. 
Set against these normative policy assertions however is the equally prevalent critique that such 
‘partnerships’ are essentially political symbols and political choices (‘PPP or nothing’: 
Lonsdale, 2005a). As a policy tool, they are simply an attempt to respond to infrastructure 
shortfalls at a time of budgetary constraints by moving expenditures off-budget and transferring 
costs on to future governments/taxpayers (Linder, 1999; Winch, 2000).  
Extant literature does not offer empirical analyses deploying, for example, longitudinal 
estimates of the success of moving expenditures off-balance sheet. This gap offers fruitful 
avenues to strengthen evidence around the (dis)benefits of PPP arrangements. Similarly, there 
are enduring concerns that by involving private organizations in government decision-making, 
the dynamics of public accountability are changing (Forrer et al., 2010). No matter how 
legitimate these criticisms may be, the themes identified by the systematic review were focused 
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on articles that engage with PPPs as a significant policy reality and seek to deploy them as 
effectively as possible. It highlighted three specific themes. 
There remains a meaningful debate regarding the contingent appropriateness of specific 
PPPs for the delivery of public infrastructure in different sectors. Our analysis shows that there 
is no coherent picture emerging from practice. For example, Torres and Pina’s (2001) survey of 
PPPs across EU local governments shows that the majority of these projects are associated with 
activities that are not typically core public services. In contrast, PPPs in the UK and USA have 
been deployed in delivering hospitals, schools and defense systems (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2011). Walder and Amenta (2004) conclude that PPPs are best suited for medium-
sized projects which can function as stand-alone entities with a low-risk profile. When 
considering whether to deploy public-private partnerships, attention needs to be drawn to 
possible power and information asymmetries. Some authors argue that public sector 
organizations often assume sub-ordinate roles in PPPs which may trap them into post-
contractual ‘lock-in situations’ considering the length of these contracts (Lonsdale, 2005a). 
 Moreover, risk management and financial evaluation in PPPs continues to attract much 
attention (e.g. Froud & Shaoul, 2001; Ball et al., 2003). Risk transfer plays a crucial role for 
achieving value for money in PPPs, but questions such as which risks are more appropriately 
allocated to the public sector and which may be better shared between partners still remain 
highly contested (Bing et al. 2005). A number of studies draw attention to the dysfunctional 
effects of lengthy and expensive contract negotiation periods (Dixon et al., 2005), suggesting 
that there is still no clarity regarding, for instance, the types of risk that can be transferred to the 
private sector and when they can be transferred (Froud, 2003; Hodge, 2004; Lonsdale, 2005b). 
To date there is limited research exploring risk and benefit sharing between partnering 
organizations and across the whole PPP project network; despite the repeated observation that 
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(dysfunctional) extended contract negotiation is the direct consequence of risk allocation and 
quantification at the outset of the inter-organizational relationship (Iossa & Martimort, 2012).  
Further research could explore the relationship between risk management, innovation, 
and other proposed positive outcomes from PPP arrangements, and whether risk management 
and incentives are effective instruments of PPP governance. The review draws attention to the 
need for standardization of risk assessment tools, appropriate pricing of risks and the 
improvement of transparency through the availability of historical data for quantifying risks ex 
ante and selecting the most appropriate private partner. Another challenge of risk transfer is 
associated with a limited degree of market competition due to a low number of bidders and 
market entry barriers (Hall, 1998). For instance, Romzek and Johnston (2002) find that 
contracting partners face barriers such as a lack of management and contract negotiation skills, 
high participation costs, high project values, project risks and demands on management time.  
 Closely related to research on risk allocation mechanisms is the consideration of 
accounting treatments of PPPs (e.g. Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003). Some commentators are 
concerned that accounting treatments may turn out to be the leading motive behind PPPs, so 
that “governments may not take the care to properly design contracts to ensure that appropriate 
incentives are in place” (Mintz & Smart, 2006: 21). The value for money assessment involves a 
so-called public sector comparator (PSC), a process that has been described as ‘surreal’ and can 
lead to sub-optimal decision making (Heald, 2003). Shaoul (2005) suggests that limited reliable 
evidence for PPPs is available due to the inappropriate methods used for quantifying cost 
savings and accessing financial risks ex ante and ex post. A study by Engel et al. (2013) argues 
that the allocation of risk under the optimal contracting arrangement suggests that PPPs are 
closer to public provision than to privatization. 
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The Practice of PPPs 
The practice theme focusing on the micro and meso levels of PPPs such as issues and concerns 
around inter-personal and inter-organizational levels of analysis. The Practice theme includes 
sub-themes such as transferring lessons learnt from one PPP project to subsequent projects, 
incentives and contract issues across inter-organizational relationships and the management of 
stakeholders in these complex PPPs. The subset of the literature that explores PPP practice 
highlights a number of specific ‘viability criteria’ (e.g. Walder & Amenta, 2004). First, the 
intrinsic complexity of PPP arrangements results in the need for robust and appropriate 
performance regimes. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals there is limited understanding of the 
interplay between performance-based contracts, incentive mechanisms and subsequent service 
performance; with much of the specific research on incentives being conceptual (e.g. Hart, 
2003; Benette & Iossa, 2006). Exceptions, such as the study by Ng and Wong (2007) on 
performance-based payment in maintenance services, have emphasized the potential for 
performance management systems to undermine PPP arrangements.  
Grout (1997) notes that when private companies are only remunerated for successful 
delivery of services, their implicit incentives focus on cost minimizing rather than service 
enhancing activities. Similarly, studies that draw attention to the lack of innovation realized by 
PPPs (e.g. Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) attribute this, at least in part, to inappropriate or 
missing performance incentives. When the UK’s PFI program was initiated for example, there 
was a clear recognition that life-cycle costing systems were necessary to realize innovative 
approaches to the delivery of higher quality buildings. More than two decades later, research 
highlights that this approach, and by corollary, these benefits have not been achieved (Barlow 
& Köberle-Gaiser, 2009). Similar criticism emerged from reviewed PPP projects in Europe, 
North-America and Australia (e.g. Hodge & Greve, 2007; Pollock et al., 2011). Considering 
incentives across the supply network, there is significant scope for further research to 
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investigate how performance management regimes and specific incentives are passed on from 
the primary public-private relationship to the subsequent tiers of sub-contractors. Similar 
research highlights the barriers for integrating SMEs in supply chains related to payment issues, 
missing early supplier involvement and a misalignment of inter-organizational systems (Dainty 
et al., 2001).  
 Second, in examining current practices of knowledge management and learning in and 
across PPP projects, research points to a lack of knowledge and information retention. For 
example, Akintoye et al. (2003) argue that the availability of appropriate information 
management systems is particularly important in these long-term relationships as they are 
characterized by high staff turnover. Learning has been acknowledged as a vital component for 
achieving successful project outcomes (Schofield, 2004). Extant literature also suggests that 
PPPs provide greater learning opportunities through learning cycles between different, but 
interdependent, project stages (Brady et al., 2005). Barriers to learning for public actors include 
the limited repeatability of PPP projects (Erridge & Greer, 2002) and a lack of reliable and 
consistent data which has also been identified as a main barrier to the successful 
implementation of whole lifecycle costing approaches (El-Haram et al., 2002). To overcome 
these barriers it may be vital to establish close cooperation to enable inter-organizational 
learning and knowledge transfer (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012).   
 Third, several operational issues emerge from the nature of the interface between 
private and public organizations. The network of relationships in a ‘typical’ PPP includes 
technical and financial advisers, funders and investors, government departments and users of 
public assets and services (Ramiah & Reich, 2006) and it is widely asserted in the literature that 
these PPP networks differ from other inter-organizational relationships and hence a different 
skillset is needed for managing them (Nobel & Jones, 2006). Somewhat ironically, given that 
their avowed purpose is to access the additional capabilities of the private partners, several 
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research studies note the problematic impact of asymmetric skills between public and private 
actors (Dixon et al., 2005; Akintoye et al., 2003). While public actors were found to have 
limited abilities to engage in strategic planning with private actors, private actors have been 
criticized for their purely commercially driven outlook of public-private partnerships.  
 This research stream highlights the lack of internal and external stakeholder 
involvement and alignment as a main cause for problems across PPPs. For instance, seeking 
input from clinicians in the design and procurement stage of healthcare PPPs may lead to more 
innovative project outcomes (Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008). Further PPP research should 
investigate the optimal balance of skills and capabilities between public and private partners. 
Those investigations directly question, for instance, the extent to which public sector services 
such as medical services should be provided by public or private partners. With regard to 
external stakeholder alignment, extant literature illustrates the importance of establishing and 
maintaining inter-organizational trust. Similarly, Koppenjan (2005) draws attention to the 
importance of early interactions between public and private actors. Frequent early interactions 
help to facilitate information sharing during the contract negotiation phase (Zheng et al., 2008). 
Similarly, the importance of developing inter-organizational trust is seen to be a crucial factor 
for private actor’s bidding decisions. Zitron’s (2006) research study, for example, concludes 
that bidding decisions are based on comprehensive risk assessments and the perception of 
commitment trust as a crucial factor influencing private actors’ perception of risks during the 
bidding phase. Further research should investigate how information and power asymmetry 
might impact on stakeholder alignment in PPP arrangements.  
 Fourth, concerns exist on the implementation of governance mechanisms (Ball et al., 
2003; Lonsdale, 2005b) that together coordinate actors, resources and activities over an 
extended period of time (Zheng et al., 2008). With respect to the use of formal contracts, in 
addition to offering legal enforceability by acting as safeguards against future contingencies 
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and providing guidance for conflict resolutions (Deakin et al., 1997), the literature suggests that 
contracts can play a vital role in managing long-term PPP relationships. Contracts can clarify 
partnering parties’ responsibilities and provide an effective risk allocation mechanism (Luo, 
2002). However, the effectiveness of PPP contracts is mitigated by problems of incompleteness 
as partnering organizations cannot foresee every single future contingency (Froud, 2003; Rufin 
& Rivera-Santos, 2010). Similarly, with an increased number of parties involved, governance 
costs can be expected to rise as well (Rangan et al., 2006). Extant literature draws attention to 
contracting problems associated with bundling the design, build, finance and operation phases 
of these long-term projects within a single contract. Martimort and Pouyet (2008) for example, 
argue that when performance contracts can be written, tasks should be performed together by 
the same firm if a better design of the infrastructure also helps to save operating costs. While 
long-term contracts may encourage commitment and stability in PPPs, they can also face 
problems with over-dependency and complacency. For instance, Dixon et al. (2005) found that 
a lack of flexibility in these contracts has been a major concern in projects across various 
sectors.  
A private partner’s commitment to innovation may be constrained by such complex 
contracts with rigid specifications. In addition, research shows that contracting parties need to 
be able to specify service quality ex ante, or to ensure the availability of appropriate and 
measurable performance indicators that reward or penalize service providers on an on-going 
basis (Hart, 2003). While prior literature argues for collaborative relationships as coordinating 
mechanisms for inter-organizational networks (Koppenjan, 2005), empirical studies have 
revealed that many PPP projects are characterized by non-collaborative relationships (Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003). Collaborative partnerships in health PPPs are difficult to establish and 
maintain because of barriers such as an imbalance of power, value and partnership goals 
between public and private partners (Ramiah & Reich, 2006). The extent to which contractual 
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and relational governance mechanisms are deployed in public-private partnerships may also be 
influenced by various political, social, ideological and legal factors (Essig & Batran, 2006). 
Essig and Batran (2006) illustrate that the particular choice of contracts is highly influenced by 
the strategic importance and specificity of individual goods and services. Limited research has 
explored the dynamic relationship of governance mechanisms over a long-term PPP lifecycle. 
A notable exception is Grubnic and Hodge’s (2003) study showing that in the absence of trust 
during early relationship stages, a far more extensive set of contractual clauses is likely to be 
negotiated and applied during the course of the relationship.  
 
Synthesis and Implications 
Bringing together the three key themes - PPP outcomes, the policy of PPPs, the practice of 
PPPs – and their corresponding sub-themes across different levels of analysis – macro, meso 
and micro - we propose a multi-dimensional framework (Figure 5),  Such a literature map, 
integrating the manifold research streams, should provide the basis for advancing both research 
and practice. The systematic literature review emphasizes a distinct divide across the three 
‘building blocks’ - the policy of PPPs, the practice of PPPs and PPP outcomes – with very 
limited research spanning across the three distinct, yet inter-related, themes. For instance, while 
the policy of PPPs theme mainly draws out the benefits of deploying PPPs to justify the use of 
these partnerships for public sector infrastructure and service delivery, prior literature 
concerned with the practice of PPPs draws on the disadvantages of these partnerships.   
Please insert ‘Figure 5’ about here 
Limitations and further research  
This study has its limitations, some of which can stimulate future research. First, the goal was 
analyze and synthesize prior research, not generate detailed hypotheses. Second, this review 
deployed the ISI Web of Knowledge database. While aiming for a comprehensive coverage by 
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following rigorous, systematic review and synthesis procedures, the database selection and 
filtering processes may have omitted relevant research. Third, deploying an analytical 
framework for such a multi-dimensional concept of public-private partnership highlights some 
previously under-researched linkages while failing to capture others. With further 
operationalization, it could form the basis for empirically testing PPPs across different 
countries and sectors by encapsulating the three distinct, yet inter-related, themes. Additionally, 
further research could examine the performance of health PPP by comparative analysis using 
matched pairs of public and PPP hospitals of similar vintage, size and catchment population, to 
examine whether a public solution is better than a PPP arrangement. This future research 
avenue would offer well-grounded empirical evidence on whether and how PPP arrangements 
may succeed in achieving some of the benefits ascribed to them.   
 
Managerial and policy implications 
Our research has managerial and policy implications; we highlight two pragmatic themes that 
will help maximize the realized benefits from the public-private nexus. First, although 
accessing strategic private sector resources and realizing apparent cost savings (depending on 
the accounting treatment) are vital considerations for managers and policy makers engaging 
with health public-private partnerships, these public actors also need to actively consider how 
the capabilities associated with more operational processes (e.g. negotiating, specifying and 
monitoring services) can have significant, positive and negative, impact on macro policy 
objectives. Second, managers and policy makers need to reflect more fully on their use of 
incentive mechanisms. In addition to targeting the focal public-private dyad, what 
behaviors/performance are being encouraged in the ‘total’ PPP network? Moreover, given the 
performance impact of a sustained emphasis on inter-organizational learning across the total 
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life cycle of the PPP, incentives should be carefully designed to drive both short and long-term 
innovations. 
 
Conclusions  
We began this article with the observation that in spite of the scale and scope of PPPs, there 
remain important gaps in scholarly and practitioner understanding of how the concept has been 
applied. We set out to examine the foundations of the PPP literature, firstly exploring the 
patterns of publications and then parsing the research into policy and practice meta-themes. 
From this systematic analysis and synthesis of PPP research, conclusions can be derived for 
public and private healthcare actors in particular and for the management field in general.  
Public-private partnerships can combine the strengths of private actors, such as 
innovation, technical knowledge and skills, managerial efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit, 
and the role of public actors, including social responsibility, social justice, public accountability 
and local knowledge, to create an enabling environment for delivering high quality health 
infrastructure and services. Through these partnerships, public and private actors may realize 
benefits such as the creation of jobs, educational development, incentives for innovation and 
competition and health infrastructure development. However, the study illustrates that while the 
popularity of deploying PPPs is steadily rising; further empirical research needs to explore 
evidence gaps. For instance, future research should develop a richer understanding of the 
circumstances for creating alliances between private and public actors from a strategy 
perspective, explore the impact of incentive mechanisms and risk management procedures on 
health service performance throughout the extended project life-cycle, and to create conducive 
environments to foster inter-project learning. Future work can investigate the causes behind 
PPP failures across different sectors and countries to draw out guidance on when (in terms of 
sector and service delivery specifics) and to what extent (in terms of whether to include 
20 
sensitive service delivery such as medical services) PPP arrangements should be favored. Thus, 
research can investigate the limitations of PPP arrangements in delivering public sector 
infrastructure and services. These proposed research avenues will help integrate the private, 
political and social perspectives at the public-private nexus in health public-private 
partnerships.  
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Tables  
 Definition 
 
Dimensions 
An arrangement between two or more entities that enables them to work cooperatively towards shared or compatible objectives and in 
which there is some degree of shared authority and responsibility, joint investment of resources, shared risk taking, and mutual benefit 
(HM Treasury, 1998) 
 Inter-organizational relationship;  
 Cooperation;  
 Shared objectives;  
 Joint investments;  
 Risk sharing 
Public–private partnerships are on-going agreements between government and private sector organizations in which the 
private organization participates in the decision-making and production of a public good or service that has traditionally 
been provided by the public sector and in which the private sector shares the risk of that production (Forrer et al., 2010). 
 Risk sharing 
 Inter-organizational relationship 
A legally-binding contract between government and business for the provision of assets and the delivery of services that allocates 
responsibilities and business risks among the various partners (Partnerships British Columbia, 2003) 
 Contractual governance; 
 Risk allocation 
The main characteristic of a PPP, compared with the traditional approach to the provision of infrastructure, is that it bundles 
investment and service provision in a single long term contract. For the duration of the contract, which can be as long as twenty or 
thirty years, the concessionaire will manage and control the assets, usually in exchange for user fees, which are its compensation for 
the investment and other costs. (Engel et al., 2011). 
 Bundling 
 Service provision 
 Long-term contract 
Partnerships which includes contractual arrangements, alliances, cooperative agreements, and collaborative activities used for policy 
development, program support and delivery of government programs and services (Osborne, 2000) 
 Contractual governance; 
 Inter-organizational relationship 
A relationship that consists of shared and/or compatible objectives and an acknowledged distribution of specific roles and 
responsibilities among the participants which can be formal or informal, contractual or voluntary, between two or more parties. The 
implication is that there is a cooperative investment of resources and therefore joint risk-taking, sharing of authority, and benefits for 
all partners (Lewis, 2002) 
 Inter-organizational relationship;  
 Shared objectives;  
 Mutual investments 
 Risk sharing 
 Benefit sharing 
A relationship involving the sharing of power, work, support and/or information with others for the achievements of joint goals and/or 
mutual benefits (Kernaghan, 1993) 
 Inter-organizational relationship;  
 Cooperation;  
 Power and information sharing 
 Shared objectives 
Table 1 Differing conceptualizations of public-private partnerships 
  
31 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Study Method / Data Study Focus  Key Dimensions Outcomes / Conclusions 
Country  Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2003) 
 
Conceptual  
 
New Public Management/ 
Modernization 
Financial management and accounting  Modernization of the UK state to justify PFI projects  
Deakin (2002) 
 
Conceptual 
 
Policy; partnership; social 
exclusion 
Accountability; power Problems of accountability; top-down partnership; 
power asymmetries  
 
Grout (2003) Report analysis 
 
Accounting treatments 
 
Accounting for PFI projects 
 
Roles of Treasury, NAO; fragmented views and 
interests on accounting treatments  
 
Hodge (2004) Conceptual 
 
Incentives/risks; procurement 
processes 
 
Ownership; risk transfer; incentives  
 
Ex ante competition; accessing rare skills; better risk 
management; economies of scale 
Project / 
Wider 
Network 
Barlow and 
Köberle-Gaiser 
(2008) 
Case studies (6) Public procurement policy Innovation; project delivery; relationship 
management; adaptability 
PFI has increased the complexity at the inter-face 
between project delivery and hospital 
operational functions, resulting in a project delivery 
model which yields less innovative 
outcomes. 
Bing et al. ( 2005) 
 
Survey (53 
respondents) 
 
Procurement processes/risk 
allocation 
Risk allocation/risk identification  
 
Some risks should be shared while others are better 
managed by individual partners 
de Bettignies and 
Ross (2004) 
 
Conceptual 
 
Incentives/risks; procurement 
processes 
 
Ownership; risk transfer; incentives  
 
Ex ante competition; accessing rare skills; better risk 
management; economies of scale 
Dixon et al. 
(2005) 
Case studies (11 
interviews) 
 
PFI process and development 
 
PFI success factors and benefits 
 
Improvements in Value for money (VfM) assessment, 
end-user needs, developing competitive markets; skills 
in public sector 
Inter-
organization 
Essig and Batran 
(2006) 
Case study (1) 
 
Relationship management; 
TCE; contracting  
 
Contracts; decision making The decision on public–private cooperation is not 
driven only by economic principles. 
Lonsdale (2005b) 
 
Case studies (2) 
 
TCE; relationship 
management; contracting  
 
Risk transfer; accounting treatments; 
opportunism; VfM outcomes; contracting  
 
Importance of when and not whether risks are 
transferred in PPP projects.  
Zheng et al. 
(2008) 
Case studies (2) 
 
Relationship management; 
TCE; contracting theory  
Contracts; trust; governance interplay 
 
Relational and contractual governance mechanisms are 
complementary forms of exchange governance.  
Table 2 Public-private partnerships: conceptualization and operationalization issues (The studies listed are representative rather than exhaustive). 
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Figures   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Scale and scope of private and public responsibility  
(Adopted from: Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 2011; Deloitte, 2006) 
   
  
  
Scope of PPPs 
Private 
Responsibility 
Public  
Responsibility 
Design-Build
  
Contracting out:  
Service Contract,  
Management Contracts 
Design-Build-Operate-Maintain 
Design-Build-
Operate 
Lease-Operate-Maintain 
Design-Build-Maintain 
Concession 
Build-Own-operate 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
Degree of public 
sector risk 
Divesture/ Full Privatisation 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Summary of systematic review process  
 
  
Scoping study 
(informed by subject  
experts) 
Key journal search Bibliographical databases 
search  
(Thomson’s ISI Web of 
Knowledge) 
Manual search and 
citation tracking 
Analysis Part I: 1,419 papers  
Time period:  
1990 - 2011 
 
 
Analysis Part II  
Synthesis and reporting  
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Figure 3  Number of papers published on PPP over time (from 1990-2011) 
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Figure 4 Country focus of PPP publications   
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
The Policy of PPPs 
Increased efficiency 
through bundling 
(Engel et al., 2011; 
Roehrich et al., 2013)  
Access to idiosyncratic 
resources 
(Kivleniece & Quelin, 
2012) 
 
The Practice of PPPs  
Inter-organizational governance mechanisms 
• Contracts / contractual and negotiations 
(Lonsdale, 2005b; Dixon et al., 2005) 
• Trust / relational (Zitron, 2006) 
• Integration and dynamics (Zheng et al., 2008) 
Inter-project learning and knowledge management 
• Information management systems (Akintoye et 
al., 2003) 
• To achieve successful outcomes (Schofield, 
2004) 
• Barriers to learning (Erridge & Greer, 2002) 
Stakeholder alignment 
• Relationship management (Zheng et al., 2008) 
• Suppliers, service providers,  financial institutions and government (Ramiah & Reich, 
2006) 
• Incorporating clinician inputs (Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) 
• Collaboration,  cooperation and early public/private partner interaction (Koppenjan, 
2005) 
Incentives and performance 
• Financial (Grout, 1997) 
• Whole-life cycle (El-
Haram et al., 2002) 
• Performance-based 
payment mechanisms 
(Ng & Wong’s (2007) 
• To drive innovative 
practices and service 
quality (Barlow & 
Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) 
Risk management and financial 
evaluation 
• Accounting treatment 
(Broadbent & Laughlin, 
2003) 
• Risk transfer (Froud, 
2003; Hodge, 2004) 
• Risk allocation/sharing 
(Ball et al., 2003; Bing et 
al., 2005) 
• Risk identification across 
relationship phases 
(Iossa & Martimort, 
2012) 
• VfM assessment (Heald, 
2003) 
Appropriateness and fit of PPPs 
• Information and power asymmetry (Lonsdale, 
2005a) 
• Delivery of public (sensitive) services 
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011) 
• Political symbols, political choice and ‘PPP or 
nothing’ (Lonsdale, 2005a) 
 
PPP Outcomes 
Benefits 
• Solution for public-sector 
capital shortage 
(Fitzgerald, 2004) 
• VfM considerations (Pollit, 
2005) 
• Healthcare provider can 
focus on medical service 
delivery (Barlow et al., 
2013) 
• Introduction of private 
sector efficiency 
(Fitzgerald, 2004) 
• Risk transfer (Pollit, 2005) 
Disadvantages 
• Higher capital costs (Froud 
& Shaoul, 2001; Liebe & 
Pollock, 2009) 
• Stifle innovation (Barlow & 
Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) 
• Limited competition due to 
low number of contractors 
(Hall, 1998; Roehrich & 
Caldwell, 2012) 
• Misalignment of clinical 
and infrastructure 
models/design (Barlow & 
Koeberle-Gaiser, 2009) 
• Relationship management 
problems (Akintoye et al., 
2003; Zheng et al., 2008) 
• Inappropriate risk 
allocation (Ball et al., 2003) 
• Low VfM (Liebe & Pollock, 
2009) 
• High transaction, 
monitoring and set-up 
costs (Lonsdale, 2005b; 
Pollock et al., 2011) 
